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In international law textbooks, the question “is international law law?” is presented at the beginning as a 
matter of jurisprudence – Austin’s command theory of law and Hart’s discussion of why international 
law differs from morality.  But it is neither as a preliminary nor in the abstract that the question now 
arises most acutely.  It is in the treatment of international law by domestic courts - a concrete practical 
setting - and the question is contextual in form: is a particular type of international law law for a 
particular purpose in a particular domestic legal system?  Accounts of how domestic courts do, or 
should, treat international law are not presented as answers to this question, but of course they are 
propositions about whether it counts as law and if not, then what exactly its nature is. 
 
In a recent article, Neil Walker draws up a list of very general and disparate concepts to describe the 
relationship between international and domestic law: institutional incorporation, system recognition, 
normative coordination, environmental overlap, and sympathetic consideration.1  Strangely absent from 
his list of concepts – and from the debate more generally – is the discipline for which the nature of other 
legal systems and the nature of their jurisdiction, laws, and judgments vis-à-vis the domestic legal 
system, are precisely the bread-and-butter issues.  This discipline is conflict of laws, or private 
international law as it is more often known outside the United States.  Although scholars of international 
                                                 
1 See Neil Walker, Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative Orders, 6 INT’L 
J. CONST. L. 373 (2008). 
law in domestic courts occasionally borrow one or another idea from conflict of laws,2 the parallel 
between the two has not been systematically explored. 
 
Why the neglect of an obvious parallel?  One reason may lie with the traditional scope of conflict of 
laws.  Conflicts is often narrowly understood as a discipline with a certain method (in the United States, 
this is usually either interest analysis or the most significant relationship test) and a certain policy 
objective (comity).  In our view, conflicts should be seen more broadly as the discipline that developed 
to deal with conflicts between laws, without necessarily being committed to any particular method or 
any particular policy.  In this light, its relevance for conflicts between international law and domestic 
law, and their interrelationship more generally, becomes apparent. 
 
Other likely reasons why conflict of laws is overlooked concern the state of the field; for one, its high 
degree of technicality. Brainerd Currie spoke disparagingly of a "conflict-of-laws machine": a court 
simply presses what it thinks are the proper levers and then sits back complacently while the machine 
grinds out the result.3  Another reason relates to the field’s abundance of successive theories, critiques 
and revisions, which continue to coexist in the courts and the literature: vested rights theory, local law 
theory, governmental interest analysis, the theory of the better law and so on.  Prosser notoriously 
described conflict of laws as a “dismal swamp … inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who 
theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon.”4  In contrast, we will 
suggest why both the machine-like quality of conflicts and the multitude of theories which Prosser 
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4 William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953). 
deemed a swamp actually figure among the advantages of a conflict-of-laws approach to international 
law in domestic courts. 
 
The promise of a conflicts perspective is threefold.  First, it offers ways to respect the nature of 
international law as law, without simplifying that nature by characterizing it exactly as domestic law. 
Intriguingly, Joseph Weiler’s editorial on the Kadi decision all but makes this case for the parallel with 
conflicts.5  In Kadi, the European Court of Justice partly annulled the European Community’s 
implementation of UN Security Council anti-terrorism resolutions requiring states to freeze the financial 
assets of individuals and entities associated with Osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the 
Taliban, as designated by the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council.  It held that the 
implementing measures violated fundamental human rights protected by the EC legal order.  Weiler 
criticizes the Court for its “bold and unsophisticated assertion” that the EC measures would in reality not 
be treated any differently than had they been autonomous measures adopted by the EC Council of 
Ministers rather than measures originating from the Security Council.  Although Weiler does not 
propose a better approach, he specifies that such an approach would require a hermeneutic that 
recognizes what he calls the “double jurisdiction situation.”  Our point is that conflict of laws provides 
such a hermeneutic.  In other words, conflicts is not simply one more solution to a well-known problem, 
yet another concept to be added to Walker’s list.  Rather, conflict of laws is a better formulation of the 
problem. 
 
Seeing the parallel with conflict of laws brings a second advantage to the international law in domestic 
courts debate: namely, a wealth of experience that can enrich and refine the debate.  The “dismal 
swamp” proves to be a productive biosphere.  Indeed, the theories, critiques and revisions that mark the 
                                                 
5 Joseph H.H. Weiler, Editorial, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 895, 896 (2008). 
field of conflicts have already played out much of the debate that is now occurring in the context of 
international law in domestic courts, giving it an altogether familiar ring. 
 
Finally, the parallel with conflicts changes international law in domestic courts from a specific problem 
addressed by international and constitutional lawyers into a general problem of relativism – which, we 
argue, conflict of laws is uniquely positioned to address.  Here, the technicality of conflict of laws is not 
a shortcoming but a strength.  The “conflict-of-laws machine,” we argue, is a way to reach a result 
without yielding to arbitrariness in the face of otherwise insurmountable complexity.  Accordingly, we 
describe our larger project6 as “theory through technique.”  This project will use private international 
law as a way of thinking through problems of legal, political and cultural relativism,7 including 
multiculturalism and transitional justice, as well as international law in domestic courts. 
 
What exactly does it mean to say that there is a parallel between conflict of laws and international law in 
domestic courts?  Like conflicts, international law in domestic courts concerns relations between laws.  
Moreover, although not ordinarily described in this way, international law and national law each have 
what we might call their own conflicts rules: rules that determine whether a case with links to more than 
one jurisdiction is governed by the law of the forum or the law of one of those other jurisdictions.  Thus 
international law has rules that determine when it will take account of domestic law.  For example, 
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which says that “a party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty,” is recognizable as a 
negative conflicts rule determining non-applicability of domestic law. And Article 46, which makes an 
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exception to Article 27 when a state’s consent to be bound amounts to a manifest violation of a rule of 
its internal law of fundamental importance, is identifiable as a conflicts rule triggered by the state’s 
manifestly greater interest.  States, by contrast, have their own constitutional, statutory and judge-made 
rules that determine the effect given to international law.  The Supremacy Clause in Article VI, 
paragraph 2 of the U.S. Constitution, for instance, can be understood as a choice-of-law provision: its 
decision to treat treaties as (supreme) domestic law parallels the local law theory of conflict of laws, 
which posits that judges always apply domestic rules of law, but sometimes create these in accordance 
with foreign law. 
 
Given the complex debate that has developed on international law in domestic courts, we cannot give 
more than a quick snapshot of our approach here.  In our larger work in progress, we analyze a broad 
range of the scholarship and case law.  By way of a snapshot, we offer a comparison of our approach 
with a far-reaching constitutionalist framework developed by Mattias Kumm,8 which lends itself 
especially well to a comparison because it is comprehensive and detailed, as well as bold. 
 
Kumm rejects an all or nothing approach to international law in domestic courts in favour of a more 
complex rule/exception or presumption/rebuttal framework.  In his view, a formal principle of 
international legality requires that international law prima facie be applicable domestically.  This 
presumption is subject to rebuttal based on three other principles: the jurisdictional principle of 
subsidiarity, the procedural principle of adequate participation and accountability, and the substantive 
principle of achieving reasonable outcomes. 
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While Kumm’s proposal makes an important contribution to the international law debate, his arguments 
have long been recognized, debated, and refined in conflict of laws.  The impetus for Kumm’s 
framework - the reality of overlapping jurisdictions - has been the very raison-d’être of conflicts doctrine 
since the inception of the field.  The elements of his framework also echo conflicts.  For example, the 
arguments Kumm gives for the presumption that international law applies domestically are familiar ones 
in the battery of modern conflicts analysis: the “needs of the international system” and the “protection of 
justified expectations” both appear in the core provision of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 
its § 6.  Perhaps most interestingly, his argument that a strong international system bolsters, rather than 
compromises, democratic legitimacy at the local level because it protects the interests of local 
minorities, resembles the so-called “false conflicts” analysis – the situation in which no real conflict of 
laws exists because both jurisdictions share a common interest in seeing the law applied. 
 
From a conflicts perspective, Kumm’s argument that the presumption in favour of applying international 
law can be rebutted if the outcome is sufficiently unacceptable is also familiar.  Kumm maintains that 
this exception should be narrowly tailored although he provides no specific criteria.  In conflicts, this is 
the “public policy exception,” in which otherwise locally applicable foreign law is nevertheless not 
enforced because to do so would violate local public policy.  For international lawyers confronted with 
Security Council anti-terrorism resolutions such as those at issue in Kadi, the public policy exception 
may feel like a progressive step.  In conflict of laws, however, the public policy exception is perceived 
as a throw-back to an older, more formalist doctrinal era that has thankfully been whittled down over the 
years as the field has developed more technically sophisticated ways of handling the problem of political 
and cultural conflict caused by the domestic application of foreign law that differs in substantial ways 
from the forum’s laws and norms. 
 The core of Kumm’s argument is a cost-benefit analysis focusing on the value of international law in 
overcoming collective action problems that impede localities from doing domestically what is in all of 
their interests.  Global administrative governance is not actually so disturbing from a democratic 
legitimacy point of view, Kumm argues, if we realize that domestic law has also become far more 
technocratic and bureaucratically attenuated from the democratic process.  The parallel experience of 
twentieth-century conflicts doctrine in the US with technocratic approaches to problems of overlapping 
jurisdiction suggests why the approach Kumm advocates here looks appealing.  Kumm casts aside 
“unhelpful” questions of legal doctrine and of politics such as sovereignty and instead forcefully 
redeploys the legal realist image of the judge as a kind of super-administrator, who has already proven 
her ability to handle a myriad details of politics and policy, that was at the heart of the twentieth-century 
conflicts revolution in the United States. 
 
But if this move feels like a leap forward, the twentieth-century experience in conflicts also suggests the 
limits of such an approach.  Kumm’s turn to cost-benefit analysis is in fact a version of the balancing of 
governmental interests often used to resolve conflicts of laws.  The problem with such technocratic 
analysis in conflicts is that efforts to open the analysis up to bureaucratic balancing quickly took on a 
rigidity of their own.  A laudable attempt to broaden questions of which law should apply to an inquiry 
into the underlying interests involved, for example, rapidly devolved into “counting contacts” between a 
jurisdiction and a given dispute. 
 
Thus the twentieth-century conflicts experience suggests that the technocratic approach is not ultimately 
smart or humble enough.  It satisfies no one in the end because it exposes, in too stark a way, the politics 
of judicial decision-making.  There seems to be no basis for bureaucratic judgment and hence consumers 
of the decision are left feeling that the decision to apply or not to apply international law domestically is 
arbitrary and politically motivated. 
 
Our larger suggestion, then, is that perhaps the mishaps, the bumps in the road faced by American 
conflicts doctrine, may help to identify in advance the difficulties some of the proposals currently 
floated in the international law in domestic courts debate may face.  The strength of conflicts, ironically, 
is that its starting assumption about overlapping jurisdictions and conflicts between political interests 
and cultural viewpoints demands that the doctrine face the arbitrariness of its own underlying 
assumptions head on.  Most of the numerous methods and critiques proceed from an honest appraisal of 
the problem of cultural or political relativism at the core of the act of judging.  The complexity of 
conflict of laws is a consequence of the complexity of the problems it sets out to resolve.  A domestic 
court applying international law is not objective in its determination of whether or not international law 
should apply, conflicts tells us: it represents the views of the domestic polity first.  What one should 
make of this reality, then, is a separate matter. 
 
So how to address this reality?  Does conflicts offer us an alternative way to think about the problem? 
We want to avoid two positions: on the one hand, that of the formalist doctrinalist who denies or avoids 
the problem of relativism, and on the other hand that of the political or cultural theorist who, depending 
on her theoretical commitments, either contends that the conflict can be “resolved” through some 
rational set of political commitments (always suspiciously close to her own) or who abandons any hope 
of resolution in favor of endless circles of critique. 
 
The alternative that conflict of laws offers, we suggest, is “theory through technique.”  Conflicts allows 
us to turn a large political conflict into a narrowly tailored and technically specific one - not to avoid or 
deny it but, to the contrary, to be able to address it.  We do not resolve the question of whether 
international law applies in all circumstances, or even whether this international law applies in all 
circumstances.  We seek to answer only the question of whether this international law applies to these 
litigants with respect to these specific legal rights and this particular dispute.  For example, whereas 
countless scholars ask whether international law is democratically legitimate, we ask whether its 
application in the particular context is justified.  This does not make the question small; it makes it 
concrete. 
 
This submission to what we might call the constraint of legal form9 is of course always partial.  But are 
we merely advocating a return to formalism?  Don’t you know, critics will say, that the issues cannot be 
cordoned off in this way, that they are all interrelated?  Don’t you know that the technical doctrines of 
conflicts are in fact highly manipulable?  Our answer is that we wish to deploy these doctrines in what, 
following Lon Fuller and before him Hans Vaihinger,10 we call an “as if” mentality—a device for 
overcoming political conflict even as it is always understood to be nothing but a device.  “As if” refers 
to knowledge that is consciously false and hence precisely for this reason irrefutable.  The construct of 
the line is indispensable to mathematics, for example, but a line in the mathematical sense is clearly 
imaginary because it exists in only one dimension and is thus infinitely thin, unlike a hypothesis which 
can be disproven or a presumption which can be rebutted.  Yet this imaginary construct, understood by 
all sophisticated users to be imaginary, allows entire fields of mathematics and geometry to proliferate.  
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 This is precisely the opposite of blind formalism, then.  Between the Scylla of blind formalism and the 
Charybdis of open policy balancing, between the utopia of systemic integration and the dystopia of 
head-on political collision, a machine like the conflict-of-laws machine might well lead the way. 
